What counts as victory in Resolute v. Greenpeace?

Headlines from the growing anti-SLAPP movement on the recent decision by Judge Tigar in N.D. California dismissing most of Resolute’s bogus claims against Greenpeace, some of its employees, and STAND.earth:

A Win for Advocacy: Court Dismisses SLAPP Suit Against Environmental Activists [CIEL]

District Judge Dismisses Corporate-Led Racketeering Claims Against Activist Groups [Taskforce]

DISMISSED! Vast Majority of Lawsuit Defeated! [Greenpeace]

That last one hints a little bit at the problem that remains: the court didn’t dismiss the Resolute’s SLAPP suit entirely, it left a few defamation claims hanging. That means that litigation against Greenpeace (and certain of its individual employees caught up in this sludge match) are heading into intrusive discovery, burdensome summary judgment proceedings, and potentially trial. Per Resolute’s lawyer: “We are pleased that the Court has correctly held that Resolute has properly alleged defamation and unfair competition claims and we will be proceeding aggressively through discovery to trial.”

I get the inclination to declare victory, build momentum and positive energy, and start framing Resolute’s tactics as failing practically as well as ethically. It is also important that Judge Tigar took RICO off the table entirely and returned the lawsuit, however sordid, to the routine realm of defamation. Greenpeace has an incredibly strong case and will almost surely win on summary judgment. So starting the march toward “victory” is perhaps the right move and perhaps the one I would be making if I were representing these defendants.

But for the larger anti-SLAPP movement, it is far too quick and far too simple. As an advocacy matter, the recent anti-SLAPP campaign work of course has a larger focus than just RICO attacks, which are rare. The focus is on all litigation of a certain purpose and on a certain tactical logic, namely using the burden and anxiety produced by litigation to chill speech and vigorous participation by advocates on public issues like environmental defense. These characteristics can apply to defamation claims just as well as RICO. From this perspective, the ugly reality is that the headlines could read: Judge allows lawsuit targeting Greenpeace environmental advocacy to proceed.

And while it is good that the case is narrower, Resolute’s ability to impose burden and intrude on Greenpeace’s constitutionally protected associational activity dramatically escalates past the motion-to-dismiss stage. Resolute will seek dozens of depositions, where its lawyers will stray from the relevant, narrow topic — but the rule at depositions is that you have to answer a question (and challenge it only later) unless you are asserting a privilege. Resolute will also ask for the universe in terms of documents, and while it is easier to narrow document productions on the basis of privilege objections, if Greenpeace resists on the basis of its constitutional rights or privileges, it will have to engage in significant additional legal briefing and maybe even compile an incredibly burdensome log of all documents they claim are privileged.

Finally, it is hard not for conspiracy-minded among us (or those of us who have unfortunately learned to respect the deviousness of the warlike legal teams these companies hire) not to wonder if this was Resolute’s plan all along. As mentioned, the defamation claims are weak. So weak. They should have been dismissed. But by packing them next to a scarecrow army of 296 utterly batshit RICO claims, the weak defamation claims start to look reasonable.

It also appeals to the solomonic instinct, which is strong in every judge I’ve ever been in front of in 15 years of practice. Give a little bit to one side, a little bit to the other. When you issue a decision and both sides claim victory, that’s a smart judge.

Here, all it means it that well over two years after it was filed, now thousands of pages of filings and millions of dollars of legal fees later, we are going to have to keep watching the Resolute v. Greenpeace case. Greenpeace obviously has the energy and resources to keep fighting — and most critically, it has the unwavering support of the environmental and human rights communities. But for most of the rest of the advocates in those communities, watching the case, the SLAPP dynamic is still hard at work.

As Michael Marx told Inside Climate News last year:

An attack against Greenpeace and Stand, two groups that have been really at the forefront of corporate campaigns, is not just an attack on those groups but is an attack on the strategy that NGOs have used to really bring corporations back under control in terms of their social and environmental behavior.

With huge respect to Greenpeace’s victory for what it was, the recent decision is unlikely to dent growing corporate enthusiasm for SLAPP tactics. In fact, perhaps the opposite. Thus an equally valid strategic response might have been to decry it as a failure to confront the main problem presented by the case. Yes, a federal judge needs to fairly process a litigant’s claims. But Resolute’s lawyers used their bogus claims, and the hyperbolic attack language in their briefs, to frame the perception of reasonableness around the facts of the case (and the larger identity of Greenpeace and movement activism) powerfully in their favor. Anti-SLAPP efforts should be aimed at correcting that shift, which in turn could require more loudly defending the principled outer-ring argument on their end, i.e. no SLAPPs on advocacy, period, go home. From this perspective, the early celebrations of victory can be seen as validating the result of a framework that is still dangerously skewed against vigorous  advocacy.

Back to Basics: Revisiting Chevron’s abandoned oil fields in Ecuador — and the people who live there

A new documentary largely successfully avoids the infinite distractions generated by Chevron’s colossal retaliatory litigation campaign and re-focuses back on what happened–and what is happening today– in Ecuador…

Simon Taylor blog / Responding to SLAPPs (Part I)

Simon Taylor, Co-founder and Director of Global Witness and winner of the Skoll Award among others, has an unflinching blog on up on the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre on Chevron’s vicious retaliatory litigation campaign against its own contamination victims in Ecuador and their lawyer, Steven Donziger:

Chevron has lost this fight.  It has lost the legal fight in Ecuador (the jurisdiction it fought to be heard in, but which it now denigrates), where multiple courts have re-affirmed the judgement against Chevron and the multi-billion-dollar compensation penalty it must now pay.  It has also lost the fight in the public domain, where its legal strategy seems to be a vindictive effort, by all means, to attack its opponents rather than be held accountable for its liabilities.  This charade recently continued with a legal attack, via the New York Bar Grievance Committee, which then applied to court, succeeding in suspending the law licence for the Ecuadorian community’s US lawyer, Steven Donziger – a process which took place like a summary execution, with no hearing, and no opportunity for the provision of evidence.  The bar designated Donziger an “immediate threat to the public order” – this about a man who graduated in the same law school class as President Barack Obama, and in his 25 years of law practice, has never received a single complaint.

Taylor goes on to describe some of the many reasons why Chevron’s claims against Donziger and the Ecuadorians are corrupt unreliable, as myself and many others have done. But the blog is more important for its attention to the broader context–which Taylor speaks to on the basis of two decades of experience investigating the extractives sectors–than on the specific details of the retaliation, egregious though they may be.

It is increasingly clear to me how the core of any realistic solution to the problem of “the new corporate playbook” of retaliation against human rights defenders must keep a focus on the forest, even when discussing individual trees. This goes against the instincts of many advocates, who  know that drilling-down on the details of individual abuses is typically the best strategy both for garnering public attention and concretizing the human rights issues at stake.

But complex corporate retaliation cases (instances of SLAPPs, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) are different, and the modality of our response must be different too, for structural reasons.

While the ultimate purpose of a SLAPP is intimidation, it succeeds as much by way of distraction as by attack. A SLAPP is a play to affect the larger public discourse, not just (or not at all) to achieve a judicial outcome. Merely dragging the attention and miscellaneous anxieties of the public (and the targeted defendants) into the muck of the SLAPPer’s exaggerated, manufactured, decontextualized claims counts as a victory, even if the audience comes away disgusted with the SLAPP. The victory is  distraction and drainage of time and resources, but also more than that.

Every advocate works to properly frame and promote her advocacy. Every advocate desperately competes for attention in a hyper-competitive environment of contemporary injustices and responsive causes, ideas, approaches. Every advocate I know is flooded with obligations, commitments, ambitions–there is too much work out there, in our moment, needing to be done.

A sophisticated corporate SLAPP can poison advocacy on all these dimensions with little regard to the merits. The corporation swaggeringly deposits itself not just on the advocate’s daily to-do list but also into the advocate’s public-facing identity and messaging. While advocates can transform the SLAPP’s presence in their frame to their advantage–as illustrating the vitality of their challenge to entrenched interests, for example–it cannot be removed from the frame. And while sometimes a SLAPP will generate its own attention, more often it is stealing from what allotment of public concern an advocate can realistically expect in total. Thus even where the public focuses on the bogus SLAPP and comes away disgusted, the victory can be hollow for the advocate’s underlying work.

Also, responding to bogus claims requires time and resources (lawyers, experts, document processing and other legal burdens) that many advocates just don’t have, which means they can drown in the muck of even the most meritless of claims. The truth does not just prevail on its own dime, at least not in the US legal system. Additionally, even the most bogus SLAPPs can put enormous emotional weight on targeted defendants, as I hope to explore in future writing.

Advocates know all these uncomfortable realities. Which means they can be intimidated (“chilled,” to put it more gently) by the prospect of meritless claims. They will steer clear, when they can, of corporations and controversies that threaten to muck up the delicate art of framing and advocating that they are engaged in.

Because a SLAPP is fundamentally a bid for attention and distraction, we must be careful in how we respond to new (and old) corporate attacks on advocates. Entering a corporate SLAPP frame even to dismantle it may be conceding too much. Sometimes it will be important to focus, as Taylor largely does, on contextual factors such as the opportunism of the attack (the extent to which it conveniently serves the SLAPPer’s larger strategic purposes), the reliability of the SLAPPer as a “prosecutor” of its claims, and similar.

An important new Anti-SLAPP movement is emerging. @SLAPPtaskforce #protecttheprotest. It is time for powerful advocacy, but also a time for analysis and conversation about what works and why. Anti-SLAPP efforts are not new. They have, however, been largely ineffective. We need to be looking deeper to find out why and guide our efforts going forward.

IN CANADA, CHEVRON TRYING TO BLOCK ECUADORIANS FROM USING U.N. DECLARATION TO SUPPORT HISTORIC POLLUTION CASE

[ From TheFirstNationsCanada.com ]

In a Canadian court, Chevron is trying to block submission of a legal brief over how the company’s attempt to evade paying a $9.5 billion environmental judgment in Ecuador violates both Canadian and international law regarding the rights of indigenous peoples.

In a submission before the Ontario Court of Appeal in Toronto, Ecuadorian rainforest communities cite the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in support of their lawsuit to collect the Chevron debt in Canada. The judgment against Chevron was affirmed unanimously in 2013 by Ecuador’s highest court.

A hearing over Chevron’s attempt to block the new argument is scheduled for January 16 before the Ontario Court of Appeal in Toronto. If the submission is allowed, the Ecuadorians plan to use the U.N. Declaration during a critically important appellate hearing scheduled for April that will help determine whether they can seize the assets of a Chevron subsidiary in Canada to force the company to comply with the Ecuador judgment.

“Chevron’s attempt to deny the latest legal petition concerning indigenous rights from being heard is gutless and a sign of the company’s increasing desperation,” said Patricio Salazar, the lead Ecuadorian lawyer for the affected communities.

“The arguments that Chevron is trying to suppress outline in clear terms the numerous ways in which the company has violated international law by polluting indigenous ancestral lands and then deliberately obstructed legitimate efforts to seek compensation through the courts,” said Salazar.

In the legal brief, the Ecuadorian communities cite several provisions of the United Nations Declaration to support their lawsuit to seize Chevron assets in Canada. These include “the right to … prompt decisions through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts” and “fair and equitable compensation” for their territories that have been damaged by oil extraction and other environmental harms.

The U.N. General Assembly approved the Declaration On The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 by the overwhelming vote of 144-4. The document since has been adopted as domestic law by both Canada and Ecuador, but it obviously did not exist for several years after the litigation against Chevron began in 1993.

Chevron, which sold its assets in Ecuador during the trial, recently had its General Counsel threaten the Ecuadorian communities with a “lifetime of litigation” if they persist in pursing their claims. The case has lasted a whopping 24 years largely because of Chevron’s forum shopping and use of at least 60 law firms and 2,000 legal personnel to file thousands of procedural motions to delay the process at almost every important juncture.

Chevron’s attempt to deny the Ecuadorians the right to file arguments based on indigenous rights – as distinct from simply filing its own legal brief to oppose it – is unusually aggressive, although not surprising given the company’s long record of trying to undermine the claims of the communities. Chevron was found guilty by three layers of courts of Ecuador of having deliberately dumped billions of gallons of toxic oil waste as a cost-saving measure, causing a spike in cancer rates and creating a public health catastrophe. Conditions are so bad that locals call the area the “Amazon Chernobyl”.

For more than two decades, Chevron has tried to block the Ecuadorian communities who live in the Amazon from pressing their claims. The latest Chevron maneuver is to assert that its assets in Canada are immune from collection because they are held by a wholly-owned subsidiary. The communities won the judgment after a hard-fought trial that lasted from 2003 to 2011 and produced 105 technical evidentiary reports relied on by the court to confirm Chevron’s responsibility for the dumping […]

The “Vengeance Phase” of Chevron’s RICO Strategy: Human Rights Supporters Must Speak Out

[ Also up on HuffPost ]

With news that Chevron is aggressively pursuing a $32 million claim against human rights attorney and activist Steven Donziger, it appears we are entering perhaps the ugliest phase of the ugliest corporate countersuit in recent memory—a “vengeance phase” that the company has long been preparing for. The claim is being made in the Chevron RICO case, the oil company’s abusive “SLAPP” lawsuit against Donziger and the victims of its own massive pollution of the Ecuadorian Amazon.

I am also part of the team battling Chevron and have written about the case before, but as quick background: in 2011, Chevron lost an exhaustive 8-year environmental litigation in Ecuador arising on its horrendous operations practices in the country in decades past, and was hit with a $9 billion clean-up liability judgment. In response, it threatened the Ecuadorian indigenous people who had sued it with a “lifetime of collateral litigation” and made good on that promise by bringing a civil RICO or “racketeering” suit against them, falsely claiming the whole environmental case was a “sham.” (You can see pictures and read descriptions of this so-called “sham” hereherehereherehere…)

But the RICO case wasn’t fundamentally against the Ecuadorian contamination victims, who, the company knew, were and are too sympathetic to carry the full weight of the attacks that Chevron needs to support its ultimate goal of simply not paying an environmental judgment that has now been unanimously affirmed by Ecuador’s Supreme Court. Instead Chevron focused its firepower on Donziger.

Why? Donziger has worked in the trenches of global social justice movements and domestic criminal justice reform his entire career, and he is on the record with some “pointed” views about the intersection of law and power politics. More importantly for Chevron strategists, Donziger was an American and had a personal style that they realized they could use to paint the entire environmental case as being led—or “masterminded, in Chevron’s attack-speak—by the “plaintiffs’ lawyer” bogeyman that decades of propaganda by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Koch bothers’ network have now trained the U.S. public to resent on sight.

An internal Chevron email from 2009 neatly sums up what the author, a leading Chevron strategist, calls the company’s “long-term strategy” for the Ecuador case: “demonize Donziger.”

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