A new documentary largely successfully avoids the infinite distractions generated by Chevron’s colossal retaliatory litigation campaign and re-focuses back on what happened–and what is happening today– in Ecuador…
The decision, by inimitable senior federal district judge Bill Wilson (a semi-retired judge from Arkansas sitting by designation in the District of North Dakota) dismisses all of Energy Transfer Partners utterly bogus claims against the Dutch NGO BankTrack. The Earthrights analysis is here. The dismissal is so blindingly obvious and necessary on the merits that it can be hard to cheer for: yay for the return of a bare minimum of normalcy!
However, the decision is notable for the power of the counter-punch it packs right at the heart of ETP’s RICO theory, i.e. that a participant in a social movement protest can be drawn into the notoriously impossible tar-pit of “conspiracy” and “racketeering” under RICO merely because someone else in the protest engaged in demonstrably illegal behavior. As Earthrights notes, the judge uses an example pretty clearly geared to catch the attention of ETP’s counsel, the Kasowitz Benson firm, which is famous for representing President Trump:
Under Energy Transfer’s interpretation, President Trump, who has solicited donations to help him end illegal immigration and stated immigrants are rapist, drug dealers, and animals, would be part of a RICO enterprise with racist criminals who have violently attacked immigrants on these express grounds.
Even more interesting will be to see what kind of attorney fees award BankTrack gets. BankTrack’s press release hopes that “the ringing rejection of this case will discourage other corporations from launching these kinds of SLAPPs.” Not sure about that. ETP got a hell of a lot of press for its narrative; even though the claims were obviously baseless from the beginning, the “sophisticated” legal press couldn’t help itself but report on them seriously, even breathlessly. (“Greenpeace should be worried.”) The lawsuit invariably put a lot of pressure on BankTrack in the process, and the organization is likely to be more “restrained” after the lawsuit even though it won — that’s called “chill” in First Amendment parlance. However, if ETP has to pay up a few hundred thousand dollars to cover every penny that BankTrack spent on the case and fully pay up environmental lawyer Robin Martinez at his top billable rate, then companies might really start thinking twice about filing these suits and organizations like BankTrack might be able to adopt a genuinely “bring it on” attitude, which is the only way to truly defeat the chill the lawsuit has already inflicted.
Since 2009, more than 20 defamation suits have been brought in France by the Bolloré group or Socfin in response to articles [about protests by rural residents and farmers who live near plantations run by these two companies in West Africa]. The targets of these actions have included France Inter, France Culture, France Info, France 2, Bastamag, Libération, Mediapart, Rue 89, Greenpeace, ReAct and Sherpa. More than 40 reporters, photographers, media lawyers, NGO representatives and media CEOs have been targeted. . . . By bringing defamation suits with such unprecedented frequency – even when they are abandoned mid-course – the Bolloré group is now retaliating in an almost automatic manner to any public reference by outsiders to its African activities.
The scandal is that French courts, like those in every other country, are happily open-for-business for these suits. Modern judicial systems have developed no meaningful defenses to this utterly outrageous, unapologetic abuse of process. (The only meaningful attempt — i.e., anti-SLAPP procedures — has repeatedly shown to provide only the most minimal protection or fail outright.)
We need better thinking on this, and we need it badly.
In the meantime, great to see civil society organizations showing up for each other and for democratic and free-expression principles.
I have been getting great feedback about it, and it is clearly spurring important discussion — including a formal review process established by the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre to gather a wider range of opinions about some of the issues I raised about its Company Response mechanism in Part IV of the series.
My response to Roger Alford’s recent post on Opinio Juris, in which he highlights a letter he wrote with colleagues in response to an earlier letter by other law professors (hosted or published by the Alliance for Justice) on issues of investor-State arbitration in the run-up to upcoming debates about TTP and TTIP/TAFTA. As I note, the debate itself is an important and urgent one — but Alford’s attempt to elevate himself and his views to some privileged privileged position of truth above “political advocacy” is grating and unconvincing.
While I’m not surprised that the author of one letter thinks his letter is better than his opponents’, I think Mr. Alford goes too far by dismissing what he calls the Alliance for Justice letter as “political advocacy,” while characterizing his own as “a memorandum by scholars offering legal analysis.” I would say both are 80% the former, 20% the latter.
The “analysis” provided by the Alford letter, as I read it, is that the world of international investment disputes is simple and objective: when a state has acted badly, it will be held liable; when it hasn’t, it won’t. What’s the problem?
The problem is that litigation is litigation, even when it’s arbitration. While “objective” facts matter, the system is driven by a competitive inter-subjectivity where the parties’ underlying resources and commitment to the dispute are often (some would say always) determinative of the outcome. States can be trusted to continue to claim they act in the global public interest; corporations can be trusted to aggressively and creatively package state regulatory actions as arbitrary, discriminatory, etc. The “truth” can be trusted to continue reside somewhere in between.
The case Alford et al choose to highlight as an example, S.D. Myers, is an example indeed. Alford et al suggest that this is an easy case of state discrimination, asserting that the objective truth is that “Canada’s goal in imposing the [PCB export] ban was not to protect the environment, but to protect Canada’s PCB waste disposal industry, as acknowledged by Canada’s Minister for the Environment in a speech that she gave to the House of Commons.”
In fact, the ban was the product of more than a decade of deliberation by numerous Canadian authorities involving numerous complicated factors and considerations, including as just one example whether the ban was required for compliance with the Basel Convention. The gloss in Alford’s letter would throw all this out this window in favor of a “truth” purportedly revealed when a cabinet minister, who was obviously not solely responsible for the ban, responded to a question during a parliamentary session with the off-the-cuff summary that “it is still the position of the government that the handling of PCBs should be done in Canada by Canadians.” I’m not saying this remark was not a legitimate piece of evidence, but playing it for its “ah ha” value, as Alford et al do and as the claimant did in the arbitration, is an example of litigation — and advocacy — that should remind us that we know this process (and its relation to truth) all too well.
And in fact, even accepting the “in Canada by Canadians” position as the government’s official position doesn’t turn the case into a simplistic story of greedy nationalism. That policy, to the extent it played a role, was substantively justified by the state’s legitimate interest in maintaining capacity and control in an area critical to citizen and environmental health and safety, especially in light of the possibility that the U.S. disposal facilities might become unavailable or were the border to be closed, which had happened in the past.
The Alford letter tries to take the AFJ letter to task for focusing on what “might” happen. It’s response, apparently, is to tell us with resounding confidence, is a standalone paragraph, what ”will” happen:
“Corporations cannot and will not gain victory simply by arguing reduced investment value. Rather, legitimate government conduct will be upheld as a proper exercise of sovereignty.”
Great! We’re done then. Or perhaps not quite, because how do we know this will happen. It actually does tend to happen this way in the United States with respect to takings claims under the U.S. Constitution, but that’s because we have a strict interpretation of the takings clause by the highest court in the land, which interpretation is binding on all other (federal) courts, i.e. Tahoe/Lucas/Penn Central and the requirement that only “permanent obliteration of value” can result in a finding of regulatory taking. Not only is there not a similar doctrine in international investment law, but the disaggregated system as currently established would be incapable of developing and enforcing it. It could be included in the text of any upcoming treaty, but the leaked treaty texts see the them going in the other direction, setting up a system where regulatory acts will be evaluated according to their “legitimacy” – again, in a disaggregated system where each panel decides for itself, expressly not bound by any larger system of jurisprudence or higher authority.
This is one of the reasons the AFJ letter complains of the lack of an appeals process. The Alford letter respond that at least in the ICSID context there is the annulment process. But it acknowledges that annulment is available only where the arbitrators have “manifestly exceeded their authority or departed from a fundamental rule of procedure.” This is akin to the standard for issuance of the writ of mandamus in the common law. If we were to ditch the availability of appeal in this country and say, let’s just use mandamus to correct the most egregious cases, I doubt people would be satisfied with this as sufficient due process.
It’s also worth noting the details of the Alford et al assurance that states will have to pay foreign corporations for exercise of state regulatory functions “only if their acts are arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise violate the investment guarantees to which states have previously agreed.” Pay attention to that last clause. Countless tribunals have read “umbrella clauses” into investment treaties, meaning that any violation of even a purely domestic contract by the state thus gives rise to international liability under the treaty. So we end up back in the realm on typical commercial contract litigation – except, as the AFJ letter notes but the Alford letter ignores, it’s a one-way street, because system only allows corporations to sue states, not vice versa.
We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that litigation often has a strategic dimension. Companies file lawsuits to pressure their opponents to settle, or to improve their negotiating position in ongoing and evolving relations. Indeed settlement is probably the dominant feature of commercial litigation, where cases almost never go to trial. Corporate claimants are certainly aware of this, and have particularly powerful leverage in the form of the system’s built-in sky-high costs and fees. Remember, in arbitration you’re not just paying for counsel, you’re paying for the judge – in fact for three of them, and typically around $1,000 an hour. The tribunal wants to hold a motions hearing? That’s probably $20,000 just to get started, not counting travel and other expenses. A two-week trial? Do the math. And while the U.S. has a fantastic in-house lawyers teed up and ready to litigate these cases, most countries don’t, and end up having to go to the club of elite law firms who specialize in this work and charge correspondingly elite-level fees for the privilege.
The issue of settlement raises particular concerns in the sovereign context because it goes beyond the issue of states using taxpayer money to pay off potentially meritless corporate claims. States will often be tempted to “settle” a claim by revising the challenged regulation to suit the claimant. The Alford letter faux-naively suggests that the regulatory taking concern is limited because “nothing in investment treaties requires states to change their domestic regulations” – instead, they can just pay damages. Come on. The idea that states are free to keep regulations on the books and just happily pay off private parties (at whatever damages figures those parties’ lawyers can sell to private tribunals) for the privilege is ridiculous. The budgetary issue will almost always be determinative – by law, every regulation in the US is rigorously evaluated for its budgetary impact – and corporations know it.
As to a number of other issues in the AFJ letter, the Alford letter just ignores them. The controversial cases such as Philip Morris’ tobacco labeling challenges or the gold-mining cases in El Salvador? No comment. The rotating lawyer/arbitrator system, in which a tiny club of individuals sit on panels and represent parties before those panels? No comment. The fact that arbitration often allows corporations to bypass domestic court systems? No comment – except that the letter cites (for a different proposition) the BG Group case, where it was eventually decided that arbitrators were within their rights to relieve a claimant of the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, even though that requirement was expressly stated in the treaty.
Alford is right that these battle lines are not new. But his suggestion that he and his colleagues are not part of the fray, or are somehow above it – that his letter is “legal analysis” while his opponents only offer “political advocacy” – is unconvincing. Just like litigation is litigation, advocacy is advocacy – it’s the butter on the bread of public discourse and Alford is more than welcome to spread it as thick as he likes. But I for one can’t believe it’s not butter.